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ABSTRACT 
 
BEING BETTER AT DOING GOOD: ORGANIZATIONAL ENGAGEMENT AND FOREIGN  
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN DPR (NORTH) KOREA 
 
 
 
By 
Rajarshi Sen 
 
December 2014 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Charles Hanna 
 
 
Foreign organizations work in DPR Korea under multiple external and internal pressures, and 
these organizations try to respond to their working environment in their own ways. However, it 
is important that these foreign organizations are able to work effectively, in order for 
engagement with DPRK to be meaningful. In this research, utilizing the case study method, I 
explore the questions: How can foreign organizations effectively work in DPR Korea? What can 
they do to more easily achieve their outputs and outcomes? What are the dynamics of the mutual 
embeddedness process as foreign organizations become immersed in the context of DPRK? I 
find that organizations in their efforts to respond to the environment in DPRK end up 
compromising their effectiveness in avoidable ways. I explore what works and what doesn’t for 
organizational management in DPRK and make some recommendations.       
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Introduction 
DPR Korea (North Korea/ DPRK) has one of the most difficult in-country operating 
conditions for foreign organizations and managers. Scholars have noted that economic 
engagement with DPRK has been “used for cross-purposes and that this…is unwittingly helping 
North Korea achieve aims…” which are unintended (Smith 2005: 22). However, at the same 
time, there is significant support for engagement with DPR Korea (Asia Society and University 
of California 2009). Influential sections in many countries such as China, Russia and even the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea/ROK) feel that it is through constructive economic engagement 
that DPRK may change from within into a country that can ensure the welfare of all of its 
people, and hence reduce the tension in the Korean peninsula. But how do we ensure the 
effectiveness of economic engagement with DPRK?         
To answer that question, I study the record of engagement of foreign organizations working in 
DPRK. I find that there is scope for massive inconsistency between what foreign organizations in 
DPRK expect to happen  (such as, behaviors they expect from their local employees/DPRK 
nationals), based on how these organizations manage their operations, and how the employees 
perceive these organizations, based on what they expect of such organizations. Foreign 
organizations’ understanding of existing social drivers and what they can achieve in such an 
environment is under-studied, especially in a secretive and closed economic system like DPR 
Korea.   
The specific questions that this research explores are: How can foreign organizations 
effectively work in DPR Korea? What can they do to more easily achieve their outputs and 
outcomes? To what extent do foreign organizations change due to working in DPR Korea and, in 
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turn, to what extent do DPRK actors change due to working with foreign organizations; i.e., what 
are the dynamics of the mutual embeddedness process? These are important questions not only 
for DPRK but for many other contexts, such as post-socialist transition countries.  
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) working in emerging markets worry about the ‘fit’ of their 
organizations to the local context. ‘A recent Accenture survey shows that 95 percent of senior 
executives say that they doubt their companies have the right operating model to support their 
international strategy’ (Girod, Bellin and Thomas 2009: 3). Depending on the alignment of 
interests between headquarters and the country of operation, the management responses to the 
problem of local intransigence may range from the need for minor adaptations to overcoming 
significant hurdles.  
     For instance, organizations the world over employ various incentives that are designed to 
retain, motivate and promote their staff. In DPRK, the conditions like restricting interaction 
between national and foreign workers are such that those incentives lose their edge. To make 
things worse, there is the overhang of geopolitical crisis that periodically negatively impact 
operations of organizations in DPRK. It is therefore in the interests of those working and 
investing in DPRK, and in the interest of effectiveness of official development assistance, to 
better understand the various ways of embeddedness and spillovers of foreign organization 
working in that country.     
Moreover, much of the literature on economic and organization management in socialist-
communist contexts tend to be concentrated on European post-socialist transition countries. This 
study contributes to comparable literature focusing on the Asian context. 
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Enhancing Organizational Effectiveness in DPRK: Clutching at Straws? 
Enhancing the effectiveness of foreign organizations working in DPRK may sound like 
wishful thinking. Organizational effectiveness at its simplest is about improving organizational 
performance externally and internally (Richard et al. 2009). This should be determined through 
multiple criteria, including productivity, growth, turnover, stability, collaboration and human 
resource development (Scott 1992: 343).  
As the abovementioned criteria inter alia determine the embeddedness of an organizational in 
its context, we examine the process of embedding of foreign organizations working in DPRK. 
The concept of organizational embeddedness, introduced by Polyani (1944) and expanded by 
Granovetter (1985) and others is useful for this research as it allows a study of the complexity 
within which organizations find themselves. Another usefulness of the embeddedness concept is 
its dual nature: Embeddedness constrains organizations’ effectiveness by tying them down in 
webs of social, political, cultural factors that act as friction against efficient management; 
embeddedness can also open up opportunities for organizations through, for example, improved 
network resources, greater trust and lower transactions costs.    
Foreign organizations adjust their corporate interests in relation to local conditions existing in 
host countries. Therefore, the economic, social, cultural, and institutional conditions of host 
countries are important considerations for organizational embedding processes; particularly, 
social, micro-level interaction between expat managers of foreign organizations and local actors 
(Kahancová 2008).  
In DPRK, where there is tight control on every facet of life, the drivers and barriers to 
embeddedness, the relevant variables, should be identifiable. Foreign organizations operate here 
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based on (i) a broader agreement with local authorities as to their mandate; and (ii) specific 
permissions for each consequent activity that implementing the broad agreement entails. 
Basically, the ‘official line’ is supposed to be followed in every aspect of economic and social 
exchange. The official line basically prescribes a range of activities and functions that are pre-
approved. Any deviation, therefore, stands out.  
Accordingly, I study the outcomes of certain activities and attendant friction/transaction costs 
of those activities under examination, which at different points in their life in DPRK the foreign 
organizations engage in. Further, the embedding process in DPRK does not generate increasing 
returns; e.g., giving more incentives to workers does not necessarily engender proportionally 
increasing levels of trust in them towards management. This is because the system in DPRK is 
premised on minimizing interaction, reciprocity and dependence between locals and foreigners. 
For example, DPRK nationals working in foreign organizations are mandatorily removed after 
relatively short periods of time. Also, there is no scope for contact between former international 
and national colleagues. Many such micro-level restrictions are in place, designed to effectively 
bring about a sort of mutual disembeddedness, which act as barriers to positive mutual 
embeddedness.                  
Thus, to understand how embedding occurs I follow a three-pronged approach:  
 Elicit an understanding of interactions and dynamics from available literature on 
foreign management practices in DPRK and in the post socialist transition context.   
 Empirically explore micro-level management practices of foreign organizations 
working in DPRK, and the response of relevant local actors/counterparts. 
5 
 
 Apply theoretical logic to the empirical information and to the findings from literature, 
to determine the variables (i.e., the drivers and barriers) to the mutual embedding 
process between the foreign organizations operating in DPRK and their local 
counterparts.  
The possible variables of embeddedness/disembeddedness in day-to-day management 
practices that this research focuses on include: the human resource management practices of 
international agencies and firms working in DPRK (e.g., what kinds of incentives improves 
which types of performance of workers?); motivations and ideologies of salient actors (e.g., what 
kinds of incentives are requested by workers for which kinds of work); and the consequent 
negotiation/bargaining dynamics between expat managers and their DPRK counterparts. 
As this research is essentially exploratory in nature, it utilizes a mix of suitable qualitative 
research tools, including literature review, participant and non-participant observations, and 
unstructured interviews. Qualitative methods are appropriate for case studies, and that is the 
method I adopt in this research for studying the selected cases of the handful of foreign 
organizations working in DPRK. The aim of this research is not to test hypotheses, as the areas 
under study in the context of DPRK are still underexplored and hence data and theories will not 
be readily available. Instead, this research aims to identify salient variables (i.e., drivers and 
barriers to mutual embeddedness and disembeddedness), study the various conditions of cause 
and effect of such variables, and generate hypotheses. Qualitative research is also suitable for 
this kind work to trace the lines of causation.    
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The consultation includes sources available in the public domain (such as aid agency reports) 
and, utilizing my current vantage point as resident in DPRK, appropriate observations of salient 
people and dynamics relevant to organizations in-country. 
 
Limitations 
All limitations of case study methods apply. 
Limitations of convenience sample apply: i.e., low generalizability and external validity. 
However, through an extensive survey of the theoretical and case study literature (aid agency 
documents) and close observation of aid agency practices, we expect to compensate for sample 
limitations. 
Limitations of studying embeddedness: One general vexing question in organizational 
embeddedness research is how to attribute embeddedness/disembeddedness. Organization 
research scholars have cautioned, “Not everything is ‘embeddedness’” (Dacin et al. 1999: 321). 
In the case of DPRK, this problem is somewhat mitigated by the fact that market forces are 
greatly attenuated, particularly at the meso-level economic sectors which most foreign 
organizations occupy and work in. In addition, it is the author’s experience in DPRK that 
reciprocal decisions/actions often occur, to an extent, in a tit-for-tat manner, i.e., the organization 
takes one step and DPRK counterparts take another corresponding step in relatively quick 
succession. Such responses make the question of attribution somewhat transparent.  
Another way to address the attribution question is to study processes that unfold at the 
boundaries of the official sphere, in less formal contexts, where relevant actors and actions can 
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be relatively unstructured and unencumbered. Accordingly, this research will focus on “margins 
and overlaps …pay close attention to processes that unfold at the peripheries, interstices, and 
overlaps of institutional fields… In these social locations, authority structures may be attenuated, 
roles and boundaries are often blurred or ambiguous, and participants are exposed to multiple 
models or logics, creating opportunities and resources for actors to experiment with new, 
multiple, or hybrid forms” (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006: 218-219).   
Furthermore, in keeping with the best recommendations in embeddedness research methods, 
this research studies the rich empirical context in which organizations work in DPRK. This study 
looks at the various repetitive actions and processes that foreign organizations in DPRK do over 
time, and the corresponding responses to and outcomes of such actions and processes.    
Limitations of studying effectiveness: this research studies mostly public organizations in 
non-market conditions. This can be a limitation as effectiveness of an organization functioning in 
properly functioning markets can be more easily measured by standard metrics such as income, 
profits and/or surveys of customer satisfaction. Measuring effectiveness of the work of public 
organizations, operating in non-market conditions, is unfortunately not so straightforward. 
Controls over these organizations emphasize control over process rather than over outcome, and 
it is harder to measure the effectiveness of processes (Scott 1992). However, some have argued 
that markets, like all structures, are socially constructed and vary over time and space, so that 
conceptions of efficiency or effectiveness also vary (Fligstein 1993).  
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Literature review 
The field of economic and organization management in socialist-communist countries is 
informed by many studies on post-socialist transition and comparatively fewer studies (at least 
the recent ones that are in English) on the management of ‘classical’ socialist organizations, not 
in transition. The scarcity of the latter type of studies is due to information control and 
restrictions on scholarship in ‘classical’ socialist-communist countries and disinterest of 
contemporary scholars on classical socialism (Frank and Burghart 2010). As to the former body 
of work—on post socialist transition—this is often colored by Western and neoclassical 
economic precepts. (There is also an interesting body of literature on the lessons to be learned 
from socialist transition, mostly by World Bank economists and others from similar background, 
of which the two notable scholars are Joe Stiglitz; and Justin Lin, who have greatly illuminated 
China’s transition. However, these works deal with macro level issues such as initial conditions 
and path dependencies and not so much with the meso and micro level issues that is the remit of 
this research.) At any rate, much of this abovementioned literature is on European socialist-
communist systems. The applicability of this Eurocentric knowledge is limited to DPR Korea as 
European socialism-communism and the Asian variety, particularly, DPRK’s system, differ in 
important ways. There is nevertheless some comparable literature on DPR Korea and some 
committed scholars. Much of the Korean scholarship on this subject usually focuses on 
international relations, unification or regime collapse. A general issue, however, with this 
growing body of work is the lack of the respective researchers’ direct and sustained physical 
access inside the country. Hence, these scholars are limited in their direct observation of internal 
workings of organizations and human dynamics in situ in DPRK. 
9 
 
Perhaps the first serious study of pre-reform, ‘classical’ socialist economy is by the celebrated 
Hungarian economist, János Kornai (1928- ). Kornai’s analyses were based on real world 
observations of socialism, his approach systems-wide, and his research method inductive rather 
than deductive. Kornai examined economic organization of centrally planned economies and 
identified several systemic failures of the centrally planned economy. In one of his most 
influential books, Economics of Shortage (Kornai 1980), Kornai argued that the chronic 
shortages seen throughout Eastern Europe during the years of socialist planning were not the 
consequences of planners’ errors or the wrong prices, but rather systemic flaws. Kornai argued 
that the command economy based on the control by a Marxist-Leninist communist party leads to 
a predominance of bureaucratic administration of state firms, through centralized planning and 
management, and the use of administrative pricing to eliminate the effects of the market. This 
leads to individual responses to the incentives of this system, ultimately causing the ‘shortage 
economy’. This shortage ‘mentality’ has broader impact on the level of institutions also, that 
becomes evident in managerial practices, as noted in the following paragraph, with relevance to 
the variables being studied in this research -- human resource management practices; motivations 
of relevant actors; ideologies; and negotiation dynamics.           
Comparative management studies identify and explain similarities and differences among 
business strategies, management systems and social behavior in different work contexts (e.g., 
geographic areas, cultures or industries). Historically, the study of comparative management 
assumed salience in the context of post-socialist transition, as the recognition dawned ‘that post-
socialism has proven to be more complex, convoluted and diverse than was first thought by the 
transition economists’ (Clark and Geppert 2006: 3). It became clear in post socialist institution 
building that the influence of foreign actors was actively constrained by local actors in a variety 
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of everyday micro-social interactions. The literature on the study of small and medium enterprise 
management in post-socialist transition draws from the rich empirical evidence of eastern 
European firms, a region which became “a tremendously interesting research laboratory for 
scholars interested in organizational and management issues” (Michailova and Liutho 2001).  
The relevant discernible strands of investigation by various scholars in this research include 
(Dragomirescu 2012):  
 Institutional fragility – institutional fragility results from socialist organizations’ 
vulnerability to the chaos and randomness of post-socialist conditions and from their 
attempts to imperfectly adjust to such conditions of high uncertainty.  
 Adjustment and formation of new managerial practices – this strand reveals that in post 
socialist enterprises, new management practices are developed by the managers 
themselves, through reflection and actual experimentation, rather than through theory and 
foreign influence only. 
 Human Resource Management (HRM) – HRM is an important strand in post-socialist 
organization management, as socialist countries had precious few capital intensive 
resources but ready access to human resources. In DPRK organizations, too, HR 
management is a contested area between expat managers and extra mural organizational 
influences. It has been seen that post-socialist evolution of HRM practices is often not an 
imitation of purely Western models. Rather, there is the interweaving of various 
influences: drivers of path dependence -- i.e., national culture; domestic managerial 
culture and practices; and drivers of change—i.e., international business ideologies; and 
new lessons from engagement with the new market and technological opportunities. 
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The relevant and recent literature specifically on DPRK is by a handful of scholars with long 
commitments to Korean studies. Hazel Smith is a scholar who was also a practitioner, having 
worked with UN and humanitarian agencies in DPRK. In Hungry for Peace (Smith 2005), she 
deals with famine in the 1990s in DPRK. She explains that the famine and the humanitarian 
response have subtly transformed DPRK's economy, society, and political thinking, as the 
country accepted some international norms and allowed markets to function. Rüdiger Frank and 
Sabine Burghart among others have done interesting work on socialist transformation in DPRK. 
Their approach is to study the history and transition of socialist institutions, and illuminate the 
‘stickiness’ of the institutions in the context of change (Frank 2010: 54). In a 2006 (54) paper, 
Frank notes:  
Though not making headlines in the Western press, the societal relations in North 
Korea have changed dramatically. It is virtually impossible to undo what the 
monetization of the economy has done to individual’s outlook on their own life and 
their place in society. In addition to loyalty to the state, there now exists an 
alternative way of advancing. The politically enforced uniformity of living 
conditions that applied to most North Koreans has been rapidly replaced by social 
stratification according to material wealth on a large scale. In a monetized economy, 
political power is closely related to economic power. Unless the top leadership 
decides to start a massive purge and to expropriate the new rich - a step that would 
be politically risky and therefore must be considered unlikely - these winners could 
become the nucleus of a middle class that would exhibit the same characteristic as 
elsewhere: a strong distaste for extremes. 
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Noland (2014) in a recent paper examines labor standards and employment practices in 
Kaesong special economic zone in DPRK, where Republic of Korea (South Korean) firms 
operate. This paper examines whether ROK firms’ employment practices are likely to encourage 
DPRK’s transition. Utilizing survey data, Noland shows that the DPRK government has 
successfully circumscribed exposure of its citizens who are the workers in these ROK firms to 
market-oriented economic practices. Noland finds no evidence of the sort of broader spillovers 
that proponents of engagement sometimes assert. The paper then also explores the possibility of 
using voluntary labor codes to promote transformation. 
The work of the above scholars, cumulatively, has significant breadth, but there is a 
paucity of in situ studies. The source material for most of these works is second hand—either 
interviews of defectors, mirror statistics or other proxies. There is a troublesome limitation of 
primary and reliable information on DPRK, and hence there is a speculative quality pervading 
much of the literature. This problem is so widespread that the authoritative macroeconomic 
modeling paper on DPRK by Noland et al (1999) is titled: “Rigorous Speculation.” In this paper, 
Noland and others contend that the economic returns to DPRK from systemic reform will be 
much higher than strategies narrowly aimed at agriculture or sectoral recovery. 
 
The Institutional Situation in DPRK 
Formally, DPRK has an overarching socialist, command-type political economy, which is 
impacted by ‘dramatic internal and external pressures’ (Ducruet 2008: 17). The state owns and 
controls all economic units, a small leadership group exerts monopoly power, a strong political 
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ideology is pervasive, and the Party or military bureaucracy dominates all institutions of 
governance (Frank and Burghart 2010).    
In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the communist states of the Eastern Bloc, the 
DPRK lost its privileged access to capital goods, petroleum, spare parts, and machinery. Import 
prices of its vital inputs rose dramatically, driving an equally dramatic reduction in industrial 
production and export earnings. The DPRK’s economy started to shrink in 1990, and over the 
four-year period from 1990 to 1993, it declined an average of four percent a year. In the mid–
1990s the DPRK then endured a series of natural disasters. These events eroded the agricultural 
base of the country, and the economy continued to decline at about three percent a year from 
1994–1998, its GNP decreasing by roughly 35 percent from $23.2 billion USD in 1990 to $12.6 
billion USD in 1998. Per capita GNP fell by 50 percent from $1,146 USD to $573 USD in the 
same period, and estimate of GDP for the same period dropped by 50 percent from 1992 to 1998 
(UN 2008).  
In 1995, the DPRK made a request for humanitarian assistance to the international 
community. In addition to multilateral aid, DPRK receives bilateral aid from individual 
countries, particularly China and, formerly, the Republic of Korea (South Korea).  
The United Nations agencies, embassies, and international NGOs (INGOs) constitute a 
relatively sizeable presence of foreign organizations in DPRK.  
 
United Nations Country Team 
The UN Country Team (UNCT) in DPRK has six resident agencies. The UNCT is made 
up of the top leadership of these six agencies, and its job is inter-agency coordination to ensure 
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the overall development approach is coherent, cohesive, non-duplicative and supports the 
development agenda of the Government (UN DPRK 2014). 
The United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) is the planning framework for the 
programmes and operational activities of the United Nations system in the DPRK, in effect 
normally for a fixed period, currently for four years, ending in 2015. The overall objective of the 
UNSF is to support the Government to improve the quality of life of the people, ensure 
sustainable development and achieve progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The 
various United Nations agencies have different comparative advantages. At a strategic level, the 
UNSF tries to assign areas of activity/responsibility for the agencies based on their respective 
mandates and advantages, and to ensure that agencies achieve synergies by working together. 
There are four priority areas: Social Development; Partnerships for Knowledge and 
Development Management; Nutrition; and, Climate Change and the Environment, all of which 
are interlinked. Coordination among resident UN agencies on all common issues relating to the 
implementation of the UNSF is through the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator (UN DPRK 
2014). 
 
Non-UN actors in DPRK 
Resident non-UN actors in the humanitarian/development space in DPRK are six 
European INGOs (known in DPRK as European Union Programme Support units or EUPS, with 
numerical suffixes, as EUPS1, EUPS2,…), Red Cross organizations (IFRC and ICRC) and three 
bilateral/government missions (French, Italian and Swiss) (UN DPRK 2014). It is noteworthy 
that these well-known INGOs cannot operate in DPRK under their own names. 
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In addition, there are 24 embassies in Pyongyang. Then, there are resident commercial/ 
joint venture organizations: such as a Polish shipping organization; a Swedish-Korean joint 
venture mining and a Swedish-Korean JV pharmaceutical organization; many Chinese joint 
ventures, mostly in trading; Czech breweries; Philipino cigarettes manufacturers; and, of course, 
possibly the largest joint venture in DPRK, the Egyptian-DPRK Koryolink telecommunication 
company. Expat managers and foreign personnel of these commercial organizations mostly 
reside in and around the Munsudong diplomatic area in Pyongyang, with all the other diplomats, 
UN and aid workers. 
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DPRK, like China and other socialist countries, has begun experimenting in enclave 
capitalism, and has set up Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in far flung areas of the country. The 
Rason Special Economic Zone was established in the far northeast of the country in 1991. The 
two Koreas have established two joint economic zones, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) 
and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region (where operations are now suspended). DPRK’s SEZs 
have attracted investment and foreign currency, without spurring greater/general economic 
growth in the rest of the country through the establishment of linkages or through “demonstration 
effect” leading to more effective economic activities. Recent developments indicate that the 
government is increasingly promoting SEZs. DPRK recently announced that new SEZs would be 
established in each province of the country. The expat managers and staff of the SEZs are 
restricted to living within the SEZs.  How do the various agencies and organizations differ in 
terms of motivations, ideology, and negotiation styles—i.e., the relevant variables being studies 
in this research? In the discussion below, we examine the general varieties of organizing and 
managing in socialist systems, and within that discussion will situate our DPRK case study. 
 
[Details of the agencies in Appendix]  
 
DPRK’s Coordinating Agencies 
DPRK government has coordinating bodies for the foreign agencies working in the 
country; these agencies are generally part of some of the ministries, like the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The coordinating bodies are: KECCA (the Korean Europe Cooperation Coordination 
Agency) for INGOs and NCC (the National Coordinating Agency) for UN Agencies.  
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For foreign commercial organizations operating the Special Economic Zones, the government 
coordinating agencies are the State Economic Development Commission (SEDC) and the Korea 
Economic Development Association (KEDA). These oversee the development and promotion of 
DPRK SEZs. The Kaesong Industrial Complex has a dedicated coordinating body, the Kaesong 
Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC). There are recent reports that the 
Ministry of External Economic Affairs (formerly the Ministry of Foreign Trade) has been 
reorganized in June 2014 to subsume DPRK’s Joint Venture and Investment Commission 
(JVIC), SEDC and possibly all other separate agencies, and thus all matters related to foreign 
economic enterprises has been streamlined into a single body now (IFES 2014).  
These coordinating agencies’ explicit role is to collaborate and coordinate the working of 
respective foreign organizations; they also exert parallel control on DPRK staff working in 
foreign organizations.  
In each office, particularly for the embassies, INGOs and UN agencies, there are one or two 
national colleagues who are responsible for keeping the other national colleagues in that unit in 
line. Hence, it is often the case that there are intersecting parallel lines of management, explicit, 
and implicit, in any foreign organization in DPRK.    
Thus, foreign managers face many challenges in managing organizations in DPRK. Yet, there 
is growing evidence of interdependent interaction between DPRK entities and foreign 
organizations working in DPRK. There are reports, for example, that minimum operating 
conditions of humanitarian agencies were gradually improving1. Private commercial firms were 
employing innovative methods to reward and incentivize DPRK workers, such as through 
                                                     
1 Aid agencies in DPRK regularly put out various reports of their cooperation on the ground and 
scanning any of those can lead one to easily conclude that working environment is tentatively 
improving.  
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chocolate pies at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (which is a longstanding example of inter-
Korean cooperation, and most recently affected in the wake of the 2013 Korean crisis2) (Kim 
2012).        
 
Organizations and Management in Socialist Systems 
There is not much existing literature in the public domain on actual organizational level 
management and human resource practices prevalent in DPRK. This is to a large extent due to 
the lack of access of researchers to organizations in DPRK. There are (1) only a handful of case 
studies of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)—the joint DPRK-ROK Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ)—which is perhaps the only industrial area where organization researchers have 
access. Then, there are some organizational audit-type reports (mostly of the United Nations’ 
organizations) available in the public domain. And, my own empirical observations based on 
three years of living and working (as an international development consultant) in DPRK. Hence, 
this is the body of knowledge from which I draw inferences for this research.  
As a starting point, for general purposes/ macro-perspective, it may be valid to assume that 
DPRK having a socialistic and command economy type, there should be broad similarities with 
systems and practices prevalent in such socialist countries elsewhere. Socialist management 
systems have been noted for the following essential characteristics (Kozminski 1993: 8-9):        
o The managers serve political priorities directly as opposed to maximization of 
economic surplus 
                                                     
2 The latest crisis in 2013 included an escalation of tensions between North and South Korea 
(Republic of Korea, ROK), the United States, and Japan. The trigger was the North's launch of 
its Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 Unit 2 satellite on December 12, 2012, and its nuclear test on February 
12, 2013. 
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o Socialist enterprises bear the burden of providing for social needs of employees, in 
addition to salaries 
o Socialist managers execute plan targets decided at level of central planning 
o Socialist enterprises practice input optimization (i.e., how to produce more from 
relatively fixed inputs), leading to poor quality of products.  
Moreover, in socialist State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), managers do not see their roles 
as entrepreneurs, interested in expanding future incomes for the organization, but rather 
primarily as custodians on behalf of the state of past investments and resources. Thus, in socialist 
economies, SOE managers adopt a bookkeeping management style; as profits/surplus if any is 
generally turned over to state or used per directions from the state (Boisot 1996: 923). 
Socialist socio-economic systems usually operate as rigidly hierarchical and rule-bound, 
and are marked by several important disconnections. Business organizations are intersected with 
multiple lines of authority (this, for instance, is evident in the foreign organizations working in 
DPRK, e.g., as noted in the DPRK Coordinating Agencies section above); the management style 
in use is a combination of participation, ideological propaganda, and coercion. The enterprises 
are deeply dependent on the state for structural and political-ideological reasons; such 
dependence leads to disconnect of the actions of economic units from their financial 
consequences (e.g., soft budget constraints3). Managers of socialist enterprises must demonstrate 
submission to the official ideology, and hence must conspicuously display their obedience; such 
conformity may even lead to the disconnect between the formal organizational system from 
actual organizational practices (Tsoukas 1994: 23). 
                                                     
3 This phrase, credited to the Hungarian economist János Kornai, is the description of an institutional practice in 
centrally planned, socialist economies in which production units form expectations of always being bailed out by 
central authorities and not be held accountable for performance (Wikipedia). 
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As for organizational culture—i.e., the system of values and meanings practiced in and 
promoted by a specific organization and which it uses to motivate its employees—for capitalist 
firms it is generally locally-defined (i.e., related to the firm’s immediate social environment), 
loose and implicit. Organization culture of firms in socialist economies on the other hand is 
centrally-ordained; employee motivation in socialist firms is therefore traced to state/external 
sources and is much more heavily imposed than in capitalist firms. Of course, the specifics of 
how organizational cultures were practiced differed from country to country. For instance, 
organizational culture in the former Soviet Union involved obtrusive party and government 
propaganda, press campaigns, and party control into employee inducements and motivations; in 
other words, staying in the good books of the party leaders, who may or may not have the best 
economic interests of the organization at heart, would be a sine qua non for any employee’s 
career (Tsoukas 1994: 33).  
In current day DPRK, an idea of organization culture can be had from a reading of the 
precepts of economic management being implemented in the country, the so-called Economic 
Management in Our Style policy. According to this policy, DPRK is a socialist society where: 
…the means of production are socially owned and where the economy develops 
according to the guiding plans of the country …. With relation to means of production, 
socialist ownership is the foundation of a socialist economy, and a socialist economy is 
developed through collective labor…. Adhering to socialist principles in an economic 
enterprise means to support and hold fast to socialist ownership and to thoroughly 
realize the principles of collectivism. ….. In terms of economic leadership and 
management, we must adhere to and support socialist ownership, put national and 
societal gains above all else while also securing as much profit as possible for 
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producers. …. The entire process of production and management must become one 
which fosters the spirit of collectivism in workers and laborers and which elevates the 
public’s willpower and creativity so that they may fulfill their roles and feel ownership 
responsibility. …. Economic guidance and management must coincide with objective 
economic laws and scientific logic in order to guarantee the highest amount of real 
economic profit. …. Objective economic laws affect a socialist economy, and the 
process of satisfying those demands is equal to ‘economic construction’ or an 
‘economic development process’. …. In order to guarantee real economic profits, 
economic laws and related economic spaces must be put to use effectively. Such 
economic laws include the law of value, the law of distribution through labor, and the 
law of planned, balanced development of the people’s economy through economic 
leadership, management, production and economic activities. …. In terms of economic 
guidance and company management, efforts first must be made to advance scientific 
technology, and all processes and factors relating to production and management must 
be made scientific. All businesses should actively pursue research and development in 
new technology and progress towards becoming a company where scientific technology 
and production are integrated – a technology-intensive business. (IFES 2014b) 
In November 2002, the agreement between the two Koreas on the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex allowed, for the first time, large volumes of investments from ROK firms in industrial 
units that would employ DPRK labor under ROK management. KIC had attractive benefits that 
created potential competitive advantages for southern small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to 
locate in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The KIC is located only 60 km from Seoul, and is also 
close to the Incheon Free Enterprise Zone (IFEZ), the main logistics hub of ROK.  
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Case studies of the Kaesong Industrial Complex note that southern managers have stated 
that they are impressed with the intensity with which northern workers take their jobs. In return, 
due to the relative improvement of working conditions for workers in KIC under ROK 
management standards, DPRK worker health and appearance, anecdotally, showed some 
improvement. There are also preliminary signs of effectiveness of knowledge management, as 
there were gradual relaxation of controls on social interaction between management and 
workers (emphasis mine). Preliminary findings are that, cumulatively, these measures have led to 
a higher level of skill assimilation, and thus a greater degree of productivity improvement 
(Gower 2011). 
 
Organizational Change in Socialist Systems 
The immediate post socialist transition period was an exceedingly fraught environment, 
exerting significant pressures on organizations to transform rapidly.  Such an environment has 
led to counter-intuitive outcomes in socialist organizations. Organization managers, caught 
between the pressures to maintain continuity and the pressures of change induced by external, 
transformative forces have often resorted reflexively to the comfort and certainty of known 
routines.  
Post socialist managers have, thus, continued to see through old lenses, reproduce old 
practices, and in this way have somehow coped at a time of great flux and achieved some degree 
of organizational continuity. However, many similar organizations and their managers have also 
opted for a significant break from old routines and embraced organizational change to cope with 
the fast changing environment (Clark & Soulsby 1998).   
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It seems that what has happened in the complex reality in post socialist contexts is that 
during the times of transition managers have rationalized their decisions in extreme conditions of 
incomplete and conflicting information, utilizing rough and ready justifications, rather than 
established dogma. It has been a process of learning by doing for the post socialist managers. 
This has led to several typical outcomes:  
 
(i) During early periods of transition, organizations have resisted change and tried 
to cling to some degree of continuity.  
(ii) During the mid-phase of transition, post socialist organizations have begun to 
try to copy management practices of foreign organizations.  
(iii) During the late stages of transition, organizations have learned to combine 
elements of continuity and elements of change, which has in effect resulted in 
restructuring of post socialist organizations, with some residual elements of the 
old organization (Clark & Soulsby 2007). 
   
Implications of Socialist Socio-economic Systems for Organizational 
Management 
Scholars have described the management of organizations in socialist systems as 
‘politically induced isomorphism’ (Tsoukas 1994: 33-4), in which socialist organization 
managers enforce conformance on their organizations to the party line as an attempt to enhance 
their and their organizations’ legitimacy. In return, the state allocates resources for these 
organizations’ functioning and propagation.  
24 
 
However, dependence on the state for precious resources and management approach to 
enforce submission to political priorities leaves the question of the organization’s response to 
real economic forces uncertain. Tsoukas, for example, writes (1994: 36):   
Thus, a socialist economic system causes two fundamental dissociations: vertically, the 
dissociation of the formal organizational structure and culture from actual practices and 
behaviors and, horizontally, the dissociation of the actions of an economic unit from 
their consequences. Both these disjunctions generate vicious circles: the more actual 
behavior is different from that intended, the more central authorities respond with more 
indicators, regulations and restrictions which, in turn, produce more of the initial non-
conforming behavior. Similarly, the softer the budget constraints, the greater the appeal 
of economic units to the usually receptive state, to rid them of their difficulties. 
Some interesting insights may be drawn from the discussion in the above sections on 
organization, management and change in socialist systems, relevant to the variable we are 
studying in this research—HR practices; employee motivations; ideologies; and negotiation 
dynamics. It appears that in stable circumstances, as socialist organizations become increasingly 
dependent on the state, the dependence becomes somewhat habit forming for the managers. HR 
practices, motivations, ideologies and negotiation dynamics must therefore be adjusted to justify 
dependency. This implies deeper path dependency and organizational inertia. In times of change, 
it is difficult to shake off those dependencies and inertia, at least in the initial phases of 
transition. It is only during the later phase of transition, after much hard learning, that post 
socialist organizations and managers inculcated in the values and practices of socialist systems 
are able to adjust to some form of hybrid management combining old forms and new pressures.        
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Case Study 
With the above theoretical discussion of socialist organizations and management 
practices in perspective, let us now turn to some actual instances and management practices in 
DPRK. Specifically, among foreign organizations working in DPRK, the example of one agency 
stands out (DISCLAIMER: There are various real and high risks to researchers, organizations 
and persons for any case study involving DPRK. Accordingly, for reasons of anonymity and 
confidentiality, the actual agency that is the subject of this research will not be named here but 
referred to only as United Nations Agency (UNA). To maintain anonymity and confidentiality, I 
may have changed indentifying details. To avoid the risk of deductive disclosure, certain 
information sources may be available only upon request and clarification of the intent and 
purpose of the request. Any resemblance to any actual persons, living or dead, or actual 
organization or events is purely coincidental. The findings, interpretations and conclusions 
expressed in this paper are mine only and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the 
United Nations, or any of its funds, programmes or specialized agencies.). 
UNA is probably the only foreign agency working in DPRK which has by agreement 
with the host government tried to implement management and human resource principles of 
international standard. Therefore, this agency is an interesting case to study the effects of human 
resource practices on organizational effectiveness within the contextual limitations of DPRK.       
 
UNA Programs in the DPRK 
UNA is one of the oldest foreign aid agencies working for the last three to four decades 
in DPRK in areas of humanitarian aid, responding to humanitarian crises in DPRK, and in 
economic development pillars. Like any other aid agency in the country, UNA works jointly with 
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the DPRK government to develop the country program, which is approved by UNA’s governing 
Executive Board, constituted as it is in UN multilateral agencies of various Member States. 
Sometime in the past decade, due to some allegations of mismanagement and wrong doing that 
had surfaced against UNA in DPRK, the UNA Executive Board imposed a number of conditions 
in regard to human resource management, financial management, audit and oversight matters on 
UNA’s programs in DPRK. For the purposes of this research, we shall concentrate on the HRM 
related conditions:  
In the area of Human Resource Management, DPRK national staff were removed from 
core organizational duties. DPRK colleagues were no longer to be seconded to UNA from DPRK 
government but instead DPRK nationals were to be directly given UNA contracts. National staff 
salaries would be paid directly to them instead of the previous practice of paying the 
government. The idea behind these changes was to align UNA national staff to standard practices 
prevalent for UNA national staff in other countries, and thereby have greater control and loyalty 
from UNA national staff and embed them more deeply in UNA organizational culture, weaning 
them away from government influence and dependence.       
UNA’s revised management practices and conditions caused consternation for the 
government of DPRK. The government viewed the situation as being motivated by political 
pressure on UNA from hostile donor countries on the governing Executive Board of UNA.  
 
Role of the DPRK Government in UNA Programs 
As a UN agency, the legal framework for UNA’s operations in a country lays out the 
parameters of the relationship between it and the host government. This legal framework signed 
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with DPRK was a standard agreement, and hence it addressed only in broad terms the obligations 
of UNA and DPRK government on UNA’s operations in the country.  
But the devil lay in the details. The UNA-DPRK legal framework, for instance, did not 
address such issues as HR management practices, financial management practices, or anything 
about the nitty-gritty of daily UNA operations in DPRK, where there were grounds for micro 
level manipulation and pressure by the government. There were reportedly unintended use of 
UNA funding that was meant to support government ministries and departments with whom 
UNA worked closely as program counterparts.   
 
UNA’s DPRK Country Office Profile 
As in other countries, the government of DPRK and UNA worked together closely on 
strategies and goals that would address the needs on the ground and also support the 
government’s national priorities for DPRK. Based on the broader strategies and goals, UNA-
DPRK in collaboration with the government would approve projects for implementation in the 
country. In other countries where UNA works, the Country Office and UNA country leadership 
have a lot of influence in shaping these projects.   
However, for the UNA-DPRK Country Office, the Regional Headquarters of UNA 
withdrew a lot of the authority for project formulation, approval and implementation, which are 
otherwise vested in the Country Office. This was done due to the sensitivity of the geopolitical 
situation and the donor countries. The UA Regional HQ also provided a higher than normal 
amount of oversight on UNA-DPRK’s daily activities. 
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UNA DPRK also faced issues from the DPRK government counterparts on access to 
project sites for monitoring and project management. I have written elsewhere on these and 
related difficulties that UN and aid agencies face in operating in DPRK: 
Aid agencies in DPR Korea often complain (mostly informally) that they are not 
allowed by the government to conduct the kind of in-depth analyses needed for more 
ambitious programming; and the donors stymie many attempts at increased scope and 
scale of activities. Aid agencies in DPR Korea are already known to impose their own 
form of conditionality. Named the “no access-no aid” principle (literally, DPR Korea 
authorities are reluctant to grant aid agency and their resident expatriate workers 
physical access to areas and populations for which/whom they request aid from 
agencies), aid agencies use this for trust-building and negotiations with national 
counterparts for improved access to affected populations. In response, the government 
sometimes makes access dependent on the financial scope of the engagement (to 
maximize the amount of aid money available, they employ a reverse principle, known 
in Pyongyang circles as, “no aid-no access”!). The DPR Korea government imposes 
other conditions: for many aid agencies, independent project monitoring is not allowed 
and all monitoring is required through ministries and/or national counterparts. Then 
there is the “7-day notification rule”—under which every project visit has to be 
requested from and approved by the government with a minimum seven days notice. 
Although many such conditions vary and are relaxed from time to time, on the whole 
the operating environment facing aid agencies in DPR Korea remain challenging (Sen 
2012: 12). 
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UNA DPRK Staffing Arrangements 
International Staff 
The UNA DPRK Country Office international staff were primarily with two types of 
contracts, based on two different sources of funding for their salaries and emoluments. One type, 
usually for higher country level managers, were funded by “core” funds; as core funding is more 
continuous, these staff therefore had more permanency to their contractual status with UNA. The 
other type was funded through various combinations of project funds; as funds for projects are 
more intermittent, dependent on the vagaries of donor funding, the contracts of project staff were 
more temporary, such as of annual or bi-annual duration. It has been a continuing issue that core 
staff positions in UNA DPRK Country Office were so few, yet the sensitivity of the work in 
DPRK required more core staff.  There is some allegation that the light core funding was at least 
partly due to the geopolitical environment, which should not have been the case given neutrality 
of UN organizations. I have written elsewhere that this lack of job security for expat staff 
potentially compromises their actions and decisions (Sen 2012).   
 
National Staff 
In DPRK’s socialist economy, the lack of a labor market requires foreign organizations to 
request the government counterparts and be dependent on them for recruitment of national 
personnel. There are many issues with this practice: limited opportunity to interview 
government-referred candidates; limited opportunity to assess their suitability for proposed work; 
limited opportunities to manage, motivate, guide, and/or discipline such personnel (as they are 
not technically the agency’s employee); limitations to retain such personnel for a length of time 
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considered desirable for the organization.  Due to the short tenures and high rotation of national 
personnel, UNA’s investment in their training and capacity-building was often compromised.  
Salaries of local personnel were negotiated with the government and paid by UNA 
directly to the DPRK government. In addition to the salary, a monthly meal allowance was paid 
directly to one designated national colleague, who would then distribute the allowance amongst 
the local staff. This was the usual practice of foreign missions and international NGOs in DPRK. 
. UNA-DPRK had only a few national officers who had been with the Country Office for 
a long time and had acquired the necessary skills gained from long periods of service. Such 
capable, long term national employees, however, were the exception; generally, there was no 
standard period of assignment for Korean national staff. Local staff was assigned on an annual 
rotational basis and there was the perception that the government used the UNA rotation as a 
training office.  UNA-DPRK had therefore requested the government to increase the length of 
rotation of national staff, and there was some evidence that this request was granted.  
The hiring of national staff for the UNA office was not a practice unique to the DPRK, 
but rather was one used by all international agencies and embassies in the DPRK, and said to be 
modeled after the U.S. Embassy in China. What was unique to the DPRK was the level of 
choice, or lack thereof, that the Country Office had in selecting its local personnel.  
In terms of location and overall functioning of the UNA-DPRK office, all international 
organizations and offices, including embassies, were physically isolated in a diplomats’ 
compound. All local personnel arrived and left together by transportation that UNA arranged, 
working from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Because local personnel left at 5:00 p.m., the international 
staff were usually the ones to close the office. 
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Analysis 
Given the above theoretical discussion of socialist organizations and socialist 
management practices, followed by the account of actual organizational actions and management 
practices of the foreign organization working in DPRK, we now consider how those actions and 
practices fare in terms of enhancing organizational effectiveness, in the table below: 
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Table 1. 
Category of 
actions/ 
practices 
Organizational Action/ 
Practices 
Sources Reasons Possible Impacts on Organizational 
Effectiveness  
Human 
Resource 
Management 
(HRM)  
Local personnel removed from 
core staff duties 
UN/ Author’s 
observation 
Risk reduction/ 
mitigation 
measure by UNA 
management 
The resulting mistrust between Korean 
colleagues and expat managers, as 
agents of the organization, should 
hamper psychological contract4 between 
managers and local employees 
 
Removal of local staff from core duties 
restricts them to lower duties only; 
hence, exchanges between such staff 
and managers will remain merely 
transactional, as opposed to something 
deeper…which too would hamper strong 
psychological contract 
HRM In lieu of the current agreement 
between the government and 
UNA for local personnel, 
individual service agreements 
between Korean nationals and 
UNA were to be created, to 
then be converted into regular 
UNA contracts, with salaries 
UN Donor pressure on 
UNA to improve 
HRM in DPRK 
Attempts by UNA managers to win over 
some extent of control on local staff 
through contractual and financial 
remuneration means  
                                                     
4 Psychological contract is a complex concept formed by an individual’s perception of mutual obligations that exist between herself and her employer. These 
obligations arise out of the belief that a promise has been made either explicitly or implicitly and the fulfillment of promissory obligations by one party is 
contingent upon the fulfillment of obligations by the other. The mutual obligations are thus sustained through the norm of reciprocity. (Coyle-Shapiro & Parzefall 
2008: 8) 
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Category of 
actions/ 
practices 
Organizational Action/ 
Practices 
Sources Reasons Possible Impacts on Organizational 
Effectiveness  
paid directly to the local 
personnel 
Institutional 
arrangement/ 
environment 
Government structure included 
a number of Ministries, 
bureaus, commissions, and 
institutes which interfaced with 
UNA on many fronts including 
in project implementation. In 
their capacity as implementing 
agencies or government 
partners, these myriad entities 
received financial support from 
UNA for their work with UNA 
projects. 
UN/ Author’s 
observation 
 Opens up possibilities for exerting 
political pressure on UNA, leading to 
political isomorphism 
HRM There was no standard period 
of assignment for Korean 
national staff. Local staff were 
assigned on an annual 
rotational basis and there was 
the perception that the 
government used the UNA 
rotation as a training office 
UN/ Author’s 
observation 
Manipulation of 
human resources 
by government 
Short stints predisposed exchanges 
between Korean local staff and expat 
managers to remain merely 
transactional…and hence precluded 
formation of strong psychological 
contracts 
HRM The DPRK was unable to 
guarantee the length of time 
that local personnel were 
posted to a position, 
diminishing the effect of UNA’s 
UN Manipulation of 
human resources 
by government 
Exchanges between Korean local staff 
and expat managers to remain merely 
transactional…and hence precluded 
formation of strong psychological 
contracts 
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Category of 
actions/ 
practices 
Organizational Action/ 
Practices 
Sources Reasons Possible Impacts on Organizational 
Effectiveness  
investment in training and 
capacity-building for staff 
HRM UNA-DPRK requested that local 
personnel be assigned to the 
UNA office for a longer period 
of time, and there was some 
evidence that this request was 
granted. 
UN Manipulation of 
human resources 
by government; 
and doling out 
small concessions 
to impress upon 
UNA/its expat 
managers 
Evidence of extracting some concessions 
from the government by UNA-DPRK 
HRM The lack of a functioning labor 
market in the DPRK meant that 
the government assigned local 
personnel required by UNA for 
its program operations. UNA 
had only limited opportunity to 
interview government-referred 
candidates and determine their 
appropriateness for the role. 
There were no mechanisms in 
place for staff performance 
reviews and appraisals to 
evaluate the work of national 
staff 
UN Manipulation of 
human resources 
by government 
Essentially, this meant that expat 
managers had very little effective 
management control over their Korean 
national colleagues 
HRM Periodically, the DPRK 
government would reassign 
local staff. When reassignments 
UN Manipulation of 
human resources 
by government; 
Evidence of extracting some concessions 
from the government by UNA-DPRK 
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Category of 
actions/ 
practices 
Organizational Action/ 
Practices 
Sources Reasons Possible Impacts on Organizational 
Effectiveness  
occurred, the government 
would inform UNA-DPRK of the 
reassignment and send 
replacement candidates. It 
seems that the government 
usually only sent one such 
candidate, limiting the Country 
Office’s choice. UNA-DPRK later 
persuaded their DPRK 
government counterparts to 
send two candidates from 
which to choose. 
and doling out 
small concessions 
for influence 
Institutional 
arrangement/ 
relationship 
with 
government 
No aid no access-no access no 
aid practice 
Author’s 
observation 
Government-aid 
agency 
negotiation for 
ready access to 
project sites in 
exchange for aid 
Evidence of extracting some concessions 
from the government by UNA-DPRK 
Physical/ 
infrastructural 
environment  
In terms of location and overall 
functioning of the UNA-DPRK 
office, all international 
organizations and offices, 
including embassies, were 
physically isolated in a 
diplomats’ compound. All local 
personnel arrived and left 
together by transportation that 
UN/ Author’s 
observation 
Government 
attempt to 
minimize contact 
between resident 
expat staff and 
local population/ 
political   
Minimal personal/after hours interaction 
between expat managers and national 
colleagues inhibits formation of team 
spirit, loyalties and strong psychological 
contract 
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Category of 
actions/ 
practices 
Organizational Action/ 
Practices 
Sources Reasons Possible Impacts on Organizational 
Effectiveness  
UNA arranged, working from 
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Because 
local personnel left at 5:00 
p.m., the international staff 
were usually the ones to close 
the office. 
Physical/ 
infrastructural 
environment 
Separate telecommunication 
systems between nationals and 
internationals in DPRK; national 
colleagues cannot call 
international colleagues and 
vice versa   
Author’s 
observation 
Government 
attempt to 
minimize contact 
between resident 
expat staff and 
local population/ 
political   
Minimal personal/after hours interaction 
between expat managers and national 
colleagues inhibits formation of team 
spirit, loyalties and strong psychological 
contract 
Principal-Agent 
relations  
Regional HQ withdrew project 
approval authority from the 
head of UNA office in DPRK and 
retained such authority for 
itself. This was done in part to 
allow for higher level decision-
making on projects, which were 
subject to scrutiny by donor 
countries, and to assist the 
head of UNA DPRK office in his 
relationship with the 
government. Thus, while the 
role of 
UNA-DPRK included project 
UN Donor pressure on 
UNA 
This situation essentially created 
confusion and mistrust between UNA’s 
HQ- and Country-based managers 
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Category of 
actions/ 
practices 
Organizational Action/ 
Practices 
Sources Reasons Possible Impacts on Organizational 
Effectiveness  
oversight, a significant amount 
of project oversight and 
decision-making authority 
rested with the UNA Regional 
HQ. 
Funding 
resources 
Core funding in the DPRK was 
very light, meaning that there 
were fewer core positions than 
in other Country Offices, 
despite repeated requests from 
the field, detailed expression of 
short staffing at the country 
office, and explicit 
recommendation for an 
increase in core-funded 
positions. The light core funding 
was in great part due to the 
geopolitical environment in 
which the UNA-DPRK office 
existed and tension between 
UNA Headquarters 
management and the Country 
Office over increasing funding 
and core staff for the DPRK. 
UN Donor pressure on 
UNA; funding 
scarcity 
This created contractual uncertainty for 
UNA expat staff on the ground, which 
resulted in them not ‘rocking the boat’ 
Interpersonal 
relation 
Expat managers giving small 
gifts on their own volition to 
national colleagues engendered 
Author’s 
observation 
 Building relational coordination, i.e., 
coordination carried out through 
emergent relationships of shared goals, 
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Category of 
actions/ 
practices 
Organizational Action/ 
Practices 
Sources Reasons Possible Impacts on Organizational 
Effectiveness  
some small levels of loyalty and 
team spirit 
knowledge, and mutual respect. Strong 
relationships enable employees to 
embrace their connections with one 
another and to more effectively 
coordinate the work in which they are 
engaged (Peltokorpi 2014: 449).  
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Discussion 
In the 1990s, as many socialist economies disintegrated, the respective countries 
experienced major economic shocks of high inflation, precipitous falls in GDP, etc. In such 
circumstances, the establishment of macroeconomic stability became a natural focus and policy 
approach. However, subsequent experience showed us that the preoccupation with 
macroeconomic issues and macro stabilization programs would tend to fail in the absence of or 
with inadequate micro adjustment (Svejnar 1991: 123). This was because socialist systems 
created microeconomic distortions (such as, lack of incentives for workers of an organization to 
respond to economic forces and fundamentals that affect the organization) that impacted the 
macro picture; hence, the micro-macro links are consequential.    
Similarly, a disconnect between structures of incentives facing expat managers and 
DPRK national workers is becoming evident from the operations of foreign organizations in 
DPRK. The above analysis has highlighted that manager-national interaction in foreign 
organizations operating in DPRK remain largely transactional, devoid of the possibility of deep 
bonding and loyalties. Such limited interaction, and the extant social and political controls in 
DPRK as well as the foreign organizations’ own practices to mitigate their risks (which 
collectively constitute the operating environment that foreign organizations in DPRK find 
themselves in), pose significant barriers to the formation of psychological contracts between 
DPRK national workers and expat managers. Psychological contracts, good team relationships, 
etc., are constructs and practices in organizational dynamics that lead, through the formation of 
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cognitive mechanisms such as transactive memory systems (TMS)5, to improved task 
coordination and enhanced team performance.  
Although, to be sure, there is some evidence from the above case study of UNA that 
limited formation of interpersonal relations is possible, which can build relational coordination. 
Other such examples, as the initial lack of interaction between expat managers and DPRK 
worker, followed by tentative growing interaction, correlated with preliminary signs of 
improving knowledge management skills come from case studies of Kaesong Industrial 
Complex. It was noted that management-to-worker face-to-face interactions were limited at the 
initial opening of KIC factories. At first, ROK management was not allowed to eat lunch with 
workers. Gradually, the DPRK government allowed ROK/South Korean management to remain 
in Kaesong on a semi-permanent basis. The resultant growing familiarity with ROK managers 
and their interaction with DPRK national staff (such as DPRK workers bringing home-cooked 
food for the expat managers, possibly as reciprocity for ‘choco pies’) potentially led to ‘tacit 
knowledge to be exchanged between management and workers knowledge in settings other than 
the job site’ (Gower 2011: 20-21).  
 Overall, however, the analysis of foreign organizations working in DPRK described 
significant difficulties in formation of strong team dynamics between expatriate managers and 
DPRK nationals. As a result, these organizations’ operating environment is structurally 
indisposed for the accomplishment of complex, interdependent tasks, which in turn affect their 
effectiveness.  
                                                     
5 Transactive memory systems (TMS) (Wegner 1986) are cognitive processes and outcomes in knowledge-intensive 
teams (Peltokorpi 2008), such that team members collectively develop to encode, store, and retrieve information in 
different domains. This is possible as team members are aware who knows what, are able to specialize in different 
but compatible information domains, and use each other as external cognitive aids (Lewis 2003; Peltokorpi 2014: 
445).  
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The conditions preventing deeper connection between expat managers and their national 
colleagues assume significance also when seen in light of our above theoretical discussion of 
socialist and post socialist organization management and change. We have seen that personnel 
inculcated in socialist values and management practices have a tendency to cling to old habits. 
Only serious and sustained change pressures can eventually lead them to embrace some hybrid 
form of old and new management practice. In the case of UNA, according to this author, the 
organization has exerted more known pressure than any other organization working in DPRK on 
the national counterparts and on UNA’s national colleagues (through their organizational 
socialization process) for change towards international standards. However, the capacity for 
exerting pressure for any one organization such as UNA is obviously limited. The embeddedness 
of national colleagues outside of UNA is much stronger than their embeddedness within UNA’s 
organizational culture. Hard pressure needs to be supplemented/ balanced with soft measures—
reflected through HR management practices; employee motivations; ideologies and negotiation 
dynamics. Both hard and soft approaches are necessary and neither alone will be sufficient.  
 
Recommendations 
While detailed recommendations should be organization specific and, thus, outside the 
scope of this research, some general directions follow:    
Clearly, encouraging interpersonal interaction between expat managers and DPRK 
workers is expected to be impactful. The problem in this strategy, of course, would be how to 
prevent free riding and related manipulation (e.g., what if some national colleagues put up a 
show of loyalty and others have subversive intentions behind the scenes?); adverse selection 
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(how to distinguish between ‘sincere stand-offs’ vs. sycophants?); the dangers of punitive action 
by DPRK authorities against DPRK workers and expat managers (DPRK has social controls in 
place and discourages intermingling of foreigners and its nationals). In this effort, lessons may be 
drawn from actual cases of expat managers, for example, of UNA who have practiced many 
small gestures of informal relationship building at the personal level with their national 
colleagues, as noted above. Another example is of relationship building between managers and 
staff at Kaesong. Such cases have generally yielded uptick of positive returns (e.g., relational 
coordination) from the relationships. It seems the underlying psycho-social mechanism is that 
national staff have become at least to some extent bound to reciprocity by the unanticipated 
goodwill shown towards them. Such quotidian reciprocity, at least to some extent has begun to 
mitigate the inherent ideological differences and related divisions that may exist between 
national and international colleagues.      
 Another option would be for the foreign organizations to provide DPRK based expat 
managers with incentives to move away from business-as-usual and experiment with new forms 
of business and engagement. Expat managers working in DPRK are torn between, on the one 
hand, significant pressure and propaganda from DPRK designed to persuade the managers to 
satisfy DPRK’s agenda, and on the other hand, pressures from their respective ‘headquarters’ to 
accomplish corporate mandates; the two are often at odds. Hence, creative middle paths or 
alternative ways need to be found. Incentives, therefore, could include, e.g., assurances of job 
security if managers’ experimentation leads to unsuccessful results.  Such measures should 
provide expat managers the incentive to remain tough in the face of domestic pressures or, 
perhaps, to rock the boat if they feel the prevailing environment is not conducive to efficiency 
gains, and thus change the dynamics of negotiation between DPRK and foreign organizations. 
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This accords with the reality as we have seen in the case study above, where strong positions by 
expat managers have yielded concessions from DPRK in the area of Human Resource 
Management, as in the case of UNA-DPRK persuading their DPRK government counterparts to 
send more than one candidate, thus expanding the pool or choice of candidates from which 
international managers can hire new national staff.   
 Of course none of the abovementioned measures is standalone, and indeed must be 
implemented in a package of measures that looks at the entirety of the foreign organization-
DPRK counterpart relationship comprehensively. At the end of the day, DPRK counterparts to 
foreign organizations need to be convinced of the benefits from any change process.      
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APPENDIX 
 
Non-UN actors in DPRK6  
EUPS 1 (Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale)    
Health: physical rehabilitation of Operating Theatre and Delivery Room in 2 hospitals in 
Hamhung city/hygiene, waste management and sterilization/provision of medical 
equipments/midwifery training/Ambulance service setup/First Aid training for 5 factories health 
workers. 
Food Security: project to improve the nutritional status of rural and urban South Hwangae 
children by strengthening the production, processing and distribution of goat and soybean milk. 
 
EUPS 2 (Save the Children International) 
Save the Children is the largest international voluntary agency working for the rights and welfare 
of Children in over fifty developing countries of the world. Save the Children works as EUPS 
Unit 2 in DPRK which opened its office in DPRK in August 2003 and implemented a small 
project rehabilitating thirty-one nurseries and kindergartens. Since then EUPS Unit 2 has been 
implementing Integrated Environmental Health (IEH) Projects and Food Security (FS) Projects 
in South Hamgyong Province. 
Integrated Environmental Health Project: 
                                                     
6 United Nations in DPRK 2014. 
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The IEH Project consists of five main components: 
1. provision of clean water to households and in key community facilities; 
2. provision of hygienic sanitation and solid waste management and the promotion of twin-pit 
VIP latrines through a community partnership approach; 
3. rehabilitation of community health facilities and provision of equipment; 
4. local capacity building through the training of village technicians and the formation of 
mothers groups with training in health promotion; 
5. training for health staff in partnership with the Medical Science Information Centre (MSIC), 
affiliated with the Ministry of Health with a focus on essential maternal and newborn care. 
Approximately 49,000 households have been connected to improved water supply systems and 
hygiene education conducted among the communities. 
Food Security 
The Food Security programme implements two approaches that address food security in the 
DPRK and integrates this with water sanitation and health to increase the overall reach of the 
projects and to more effectively make stakeholders aware of the link between nutrition, overall 
sanitation and health. 
The first is addressing the nutritional food security shortfall that vulnerable groups are exposed 
to during the winter months.  Since vegetable supply during the winter is minimal and results in 
vitamin and micronutrient deficiencies by spring. 
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A total of 36 green houses have been constructed to produce sufficient vegetables for the winter 
period for the Institutions of Care in Hamhung City which includes in addition to crèches, 
kindergartens, orphanages, primary schools facilities that cater to the elderly, the disabled, 
several TB and hepatitis sanatoria, and the paediatric and maternity hospitals. It is estimated by 
the stakeholders in the project that the general population of Hamhung with an estimated 
800,000 population, but especially its children will be able to eat more varied diet of vegetables 
during the winter. 
We work closely with the Pyongyang Vegetable Research Institute to facilitate the introduction 
of vegetables with high protein (pulses), essential nutrient and micronutrient content; and the 
mentoring of farm technicians to strengthen greenhouse operational and production expertise and 
skills. 
Other projects address the need to protect agricultural land from inundation damage and 
environmental degradation. An integrated watershed management project in Yonggwang, 
Jongpyong and Sinpo counties has the objective of protecting and rehabilitating agricultural land 
for sustainable crop production. This includes the rehabilitation of irrigation headwork 
infrastructure to increase the area available for irrigated rice, corn, and vegetable cropping from 
spring to summer; the augmentation of facilities to provide increased reforestation material; and 
the stabilisation of slope land through soil and water conservation structures. Thus the project, 
through its activities has increased the calorific and nutritional food security for stakeholders and 
beneficiaries. 
EUPS 2 is also working on providing better access to dietary diversification through a project 
that targets children in schools by supporting local capacities. 
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EUPS 2 is working to provide lasting benefits to children and will reach 500,000 beneficiaries 
through its current programme over the next 3 years. 
EUPS 2 also worked in the field of children’s nutrition during the end of 2011 and through to 
2012.  The organization hopes to pursue activities in this sector further in the future. 
EUPS 2 considers that Disaster Preparedness and response is an integral part to every 
programme, according we actively seek funds for pre-positioning of emergency stock.  EUPS 2 
has been working in the field of emergency response and pre-positioned non-food items in South 
Hamgyong Province for upcoming emergency. 
 
EUPS 3 (Concern Worldwide) EUPS Unit 3 (Concern Worldwide) 
Programme Overview 
History of the Country Programme 
Concern arrived in 1998 to assist in the aftermath of extensive flood damage in the country. 
There was initial involvement in relief but this evolved into rehabilitation and is now shifting 
towards development. Concern has worked since 2005 under the umbrella of the ‘European 
Union Programme Support’ (EUPS) and is now locally recognised as EUPS Unit 3. Concern is 
one of only six INGOs in DPRK. Development actions have been addressing immediate, 
medium-term and long-term needs (in order inter alia to improve returns to assets and to reduce 
the risk of malnutrition and water/sanitation-related disease) of the most vulnerable population. 
 53 
 
5
3
 
Concern has also helped to identify policy and strategy concerning the simultaneous protection 
and development of natural/environmental resources. 
The key problems in DPRK are complex and chronic (structural). Concern’s approaches of 
pioneering work have demonstrated ways to sustainably improve household food security, 
nutrition and access to clean water and sanitation. Our approaches have been recognized and 
replicated by government and non government institutions. We continue therefore to build our 
programme based on past experience and emerging new opportunity. 
Coverage 
We have been working in South Pyongan and North Hwanghae Provinces and recently in 
Kangwon Province which is considered to be one of the poorest areas in DPRK. 
We also started work on a trial farm in Ryongsong district in Pyongyang. The current strategic 
plan is expected to spread actions to 7 counties in North/South-East Provinces which are 
considered to be amongst the poorest. Annual beneficiaries would number about 150,000 to 
200,000. 
Core Funding 
Core funding comes from EU (AIDCO) (40%), Irish Aid (IA) (30%) and SIDA (20%). 
Additional funding (10%) comes from Concern, UNICEF, WHO, Bank of Ireland, Irish Gas and 
UK Embassy. 
Our work in the DPR Korea 
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We support the extreme poor in disadvantaged areas in order to contribute to sustainable 
improvement in their lives through programmes focusing on: (i) improvement in household and 
community assets and  (ii) reduction in risk, vulnerability and inequality. Programmes aim to be 
replicable without ongoing support from Concern. 
Our Projects 
Our main Water, Environment and Health (WEH) and Food, Income & Market  Programme 
(FIM) programmes comprise several projects. These include: 
Kumchon Water and Environmental Health Project (SIDA)-2011-2013 
Multi-Sector Nutrition & Food Security (MSNFS) Project – (EU) – 2012-2014 
Singye Water and Sanitation Project (CUSA)-2012 
Community-Based Urban Nutrition and Food Security Project (EU)-2009-2012 
Conservation Agriculture for Sustainable Food Security in Agro-climatic Zones (Irish Aid)-
2012-2015 
 
 
EUPS 4 (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe)  
Welthungerhilfe has been working in the DPRK since 1997, shortly after the country had been 
hit by a severe hunger catastrophe. During the first years, Welthungerhilfe distributed mainly 
emergency items: food, coal and winter clothes.  At the end of the 1990s we started to implement 
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in cooperation with our Korean partners and stakeholders agricultural projects in South 
Hwanghae and North Pyong’an Provinces to support people and cooperatives to produce food by 
themselves. The agricultural cooperatives were supported to improve their seeds, to diversify and 
intensify agricultural production and to maintain their agricultural machinery in a more efficient 
way. 
After 2000, the field and sectors of operations were expanded. Integrated rural development 
projects were carried out. Renewable energy approaches were introduced. Hundreds of 
greenhouses were built, mainly in the neighborhood of social institutions, like kindergartens and 
nursery homes, providing them with fresh vegetables all year round. Villages and towns have 
been supplied with clean drinking water systems and have now safe and clean water throughout 
the day. A large maize seed processing factory has been built which contributes essentially to the 
food production in DPRK. Barren hills and mountains are reforested in order to prevent future 
disasters like landslides and floods. Sloping land user groups were introduced to agro-forestry 
approaches in order to produce in a sustainable way food as well on sloping lands. 
In our work we follow principles of mutual respect and understanding, openness and 
transparency. 
 
EUPS 5 (Triangle Génération Humanitaire)   
Triangle Génération Humanitaire provides concrete solutions to alleviate the suffering of 
populations living in unacceptable circumstances. It fights poverty and defends social 
integration. It offers support to victims of conflict, natural catastrophes and other events causing 
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precarious living conditions. Triangle GH’s action, integrating emergency and development, is 
characterized by a global, comprehensive approach to humanitarian assistance. 
In DPRK, since its initial survey in August 1998, and the subsequent installation of the mission 
in December 2000, Triangle GH has performed some 27 programs ranging from agricultural 
development which included rehabilitation of 11.000 hectares of tideland dedicated to rice 
production, to rehabilitation of drinking water networks and sanitation infrastructures, thermal 
insulation of schools and medical facilities, emergency supplies after the Ryongchon rail 
catastrophe in 2004, and social assistance to elderly in partnership with the Korean Federation 
for the Care of the Aged People (KFCA). 
Food Security Programme 
One of the elements of the food crisis presently striking the DPRK is the lack of proteins and 
micronutrient in the food. This nutritional deficiency particularly affects young children between 
0 and 6 years old (11% of the population) whose specific nutritional needs can’t be covered. The 
taking care of young children being normally assumed by the social institutions, the 
improvement and sustainable diversification of their food goes through the support to the 
communitarian farm units producing for these institutions. 
Triangle GH’s project teams are now involved in supporting 2 inland fish farms of South 
Hamgyong Province (in Sinhung and Yonggwang Counties) and 2 dairy farms in Sariwon city 
(South Hwanghae Province) and Daeane city (Nampo District), with integrated activities in 
relevant food processing, conservation and distribution sectors. The main activities undertaken 
from January 2010 to August 2013 in the framework of the program are the following: 
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• Inception phase, baseline survey and stakeholders’ capacities assessment. 
• Design of integrated fish farming production model. 
• Design of cropping systems and livestock management models. 
• Design of logistic model for preservation and distribution of the fish production. 
• Design of logistic model for transportation and distribution of the milk and dairy 
products. 
• Purchase of equipment and materials to support fish – crop – livestock productions. 
• Construction/rehabilitation works to support fish – crop – livestock productions. 
• Purchase of equipment and materials to support milk – livestock productions and milk 
processing. 
• Construction/rehabilitation works to support livestock – milk productions. 
• Purchase of equipment and materials to support new logistic models. 
• Purchase of equipment and materials to support improved feeding practices in child 
institutions. 
• Setting up of pilot activities in Jung Ak farm and replication of outputs in dairy farms. 
• Setting-up of networks with cooperative farms for knowledge and inputs exchanges. 
• Trainings on integrated fish farming practices, fish farm management, fish preservation 
methods and income generating activities related with fish sector. 
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• Trainings on farming practices, animal husbandry, livestock management. 
• Trainings on nutrition education and hygiene practices for the staff of child welfare 
institutions. 
The Food Security Programme will benefit to 90 000 persons in South Hamgyong Province and 
65,000 persons in South Hwanghae and Nampo District. 
Water Sanitation and Hygiene Programme 
The overwhelming needs in terms of water and sanitation led Triangle GH to carry out projects 
to rehabilitate and to improve water supplies, especially in urban areas, where an estimated 60% 
of DPRK population live. These urban populations, such as Munchon inhabitants, are bound to 
be considerably more vulnerable to water-borne diseases than the rural populations. 
The town of Munchon, 42 500 inhabitants, is located on the eastern coast of DPRK. Like many 
cities of the country, its public water system was built in the 1960’s and owing to the lack of 
maintenance the system became obsolete and had multiple breakdowns. Previous projects run by 
Triangle GH led rehabilitated a major portion of the water system. However, one district out of 
the town’s four districts still lacks access to potable water. The current program aims to tackle 
this lack of access to potable water and to improve the environmental sanitation in Munchon 
town. 
The main activities undertaken from October 2009 to November 2011 in the framework of the 
program include conducting baseline surveys, drafting technical designs and engineering 
specifications, construction and rehabilitation for latrines, DEWATS units, wastewater channels 
network, and water supply network extensions. It also included testing of the rehabilitated 
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facilities, trainings of Munchon technical staff and focal points, and publishing awareness tools 
on hygiene promotion and water use. The Programme will benefit to 42 500 persons in Kangwon 
Province. 
Psychosocial and Social Assistance Programme 
Due to the lack of funding, this program has been suspended since 2008. However, in 2012 
renewed access to the Korean Federation for the Care of the Aged (KFCA) allowed to submit a 
concept note to the European Commission (DevCo) to support the federation in strengthening its 
advocacy and fund raising capacities and provide direct support to several provincial Old People 
Homes (infrastructural & water and sanitation intervention, provision of drugs and support to in-
house vegetable and agricultural production) 
Comprehensive list of donors 
DEVCO – EuropeAid Cooperation Office; for the Food Security and WASH programs 
SIDA – Swedish Cooperation; for the WASH program 
Aide Alimentaire Programmé (French Government inter-ministries humanitarian fund); for the 
Food Security program 
 
EUPS 7 (Handicap International)    
Disability profile of DPRK - According to the analysis of the data from the 2008 DPRK Census 
conducted by the Central Statistical Bureau, people with disabilities constitute 6.3% of the 
population aged 5 years and above.  There is no data available on children with disabilities in the 
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age group of 0-5 years and the overall prevalence could be much higher if disabilities in this age 
group are also taken into consideration. There is a higher prevalence of disability among the 
female population. Between urban and rural populations, the rural population has higher 
prevalence in all forms of disability. Disability increases as age progresses in DPRK making it 
crucial to address disability issues among older persons and also among women in DPRK. 
About Handicap International (HI) 
HI which is referred to as European Union Programme Support Unit 07 (EUPS 7) in DPRK has 
been implementing projects and programmes for persons with disabilities since 2001. The 
activities are jointly implemented with its national partner, the Korean Federation for the 
Protection of Disabled People (KFPD). The key thematic areas of involvement are; 
Physical Rehabilitation, Institutional Capacity-Building, Advocacy, Education, Livelihoods and 
Inclusive Sports, Arts and Culture 
Physical Rehabilitation; HI has been supporting 2 physical rehabilitation centres in the form of 
technical skill building, supply of raw materials and in production of orthotic and prosthetic 
devices. 
Advocacy; Along with the KFPD, HI has been advocating for the inclusion of disabled people in 
the national humanitarian and development agenda of the government, UN ,Donors and INGOs 
that are working in DPRK. Mainstreaming disability within the policies and programmes of the 
government and the UN has been a key activity since 2009. Raising awareness about issues 
confronting people with disabilities is one of the major advocacy works of HI and KFPD in 
DPRK. 
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Livelihood; Along with KFPD, programmes for income generation and improvement in the 
livelihoods of people with disabilities has been implemented in select provinces of DPRK. KFPD 
has also been providing vocational training through its centres in Pyongyang and Wanson. 
Institutional Capacity-Building; HI has been involved in building the capacity of the KFPD Head 
Office and its branches in all the provinces in key areas such as project cycle management, 
finance management, implementation of DPRK disability legislation and in advocating for 
inclusion of disabled people in the national policies and programmes. 
Education: HI in partnership with KFPD has been supporting 11 special schools for children with 
sensory disabilities in the form of infrastructure renovation, teachers training and integrating 
education with health and nutrition by constructing Green Houses. 
Inclusive Sports, Arts and Culture;  With a view to promote inclusive communities for persons 
with disabilities, HI and KFPD have been promoting inclusive sports, arts and cultural events. 
These initiatives have led to increase in awareness about issues confronting disabled people and 
are paving way for their inclusion within the communities. 
 
Red Cross Movement 
IFRC -- The programmes supported by the IFRC in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) are all streamlined with the strategic aims of IFRC’s Strategy 2020: 
Strategic aim 1: Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters 
Strategic aim 2: Enable healthy and safe living 
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Strategic aim 3: Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace 
The IFRC supports the DPRK Red Cross in four areas: health and care, water and sanitation, 
disaster management, and organizational development. The provision of essential medicines to 
2,030 clinics remains the largest component of Federation support. At the same time, the health 
and care programme has successfully piloted the community-based health and first aid (CBHFA) 
programme in two counties and expanding the activities in new areas. The main focus of 
CBHFA is to empower communities through activities related to health promotion, health in 
emergencies, first aid and behavior change communication. Within the water and sanitation 
programme, the ongoing construction of 19 water and sanitation systems will bring the total 
number of people supplied with clean drinking water in the past ten years to over 600,000.  The 
disaster management programme is strongly focusing on community-based disaster risk 
reduction (CDRR) including strengthening community-based mechanisms for disaster 
preparedness, awareness generation,  early warning system,  mitigation measures (like river 
dykes, culverts, irrigation channels etc.) , tree planting as a long-term mitigation measure, as well 
as on livelihood-improvement for the reduction of vulnerability. Also, road safety is becoming 
increasingly important with the rapidly growing number of cars, especially in Pyongyang. Along 
with this, strengthening  DPRK Red Cross for emegency response is also a priority area of work. 
The DPRK Red Cross works in the framework of a three-year cooperation agreement strategy 
(CAS) with nine partner national societies: Australian Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, Danish 
Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, German Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross, Norwegian Red 
Cross, Spanish Red Cross, and Swedish Red Cross. The current CAS agreement up to 2012 was 
signed in October 2009. The DPRK country plan and budget is supported by Danish Red 
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Cross/Danish government, Finnish Red Cross/Finnish government, German Red Cross/German 
government, Japanese Red Cross, Netherlands government, Norwegian Red Cross/Norwegian 
government, Spanish Red Cross, British Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross/Swedish 
government. In addition, three Europe Aid-funded projects are being implemented through the 
Danish Red Cross; Swedish Red Cross; and Finnish Red Cross. 
In a significant new development, Red Cross Red Crescent support to the DPRK has been 
boosted by a 500,000 Euro grant from the European Commission, made through the Swedish 
Red Cross, for a three-year project to enhance resilience in face of disasters and food security. 
The project will assist 25,000 people in the Pukchang and Unsan districts of South Phyongan 
Province. It will be implemented in cooperation with the DPRK Red Cross,  IFRC, Danish Red 
Cross, Finnish Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross, along with 
contributions from other partners. 
At county, provincial, and national level, the ministries of public health, city management, 
people’s security, and land and environmental protection contribute with technical advice and 
material support to the Red Cross programmes. Collaboration with UN agencies consists of 
information exchange as well as the agreement on the contents of the medical kits, the role 
division in disaster response situations, and training initiatives in different areas. The Red Cross 
also benefits from specialized expertise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the 
DPRK, where they are called European Union project support (EUPS) units. 
 
ICRC:  
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Assists three Provincial hospitals in the DPRK with on-site training, rehabilitation, material and 
drugs donations. 
Supports physical a rehabilitation centre in providing services to an increasing number of 
beneficiaries, notably with construction material donations to extend the centre capacity in 
Pyongyang. 
Strengthens dialogue with the DPRK authorities and National Society 
 
Resident Bilateral/Governmental Missions 
Swiss Agency for Development and Corporation (SDC) -- The Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC) is supporting the DPR of Korea in its efforts to cultivate sloping lands 
for agricultural purposes and to protect them against erosion. It promotes the health of the 
population by providing better access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities. It 
also distributes milk powder through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP). 
Sloping Land Management 
Agricultural use of sloping land and protection against erosion. 
Food shortages have forced farmers to make use of very steep sloping land. This has led to 
deforestation and erosion, thus increasing the risk of natural disasters. Since 2005 the SDC, in 
cooperation with local partners, has promoted the sustainable production of rice, potatoes, wheat 
and other crops on sloping land. Moreover this land has been protected against erosion by 
planting fruit trees and grass ledges on the slopes. 
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Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
Improved health thanks to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities. 
Poorly maintained water supplies and the lack of sanitary installations are the causes of many 
diseases. Diarrhoea and related illnesses are widespread in the DPRK. Those affected suffer from 
the loss of valuable vitamins and calories. 
Clean drinking water improves food security, reduces child mortality, combats poverty and 
contributes generally to better health for people in the DPRK. 
Food Security 
Swiss milk powder for mothers and children. 
Switzerland delivers milk powder to WFP in DPRK since 1995. Local production units process 
the milk powder together with rice, maize, cereals and soya to create food that is rich in proteins 
and vitamins. Through the structures of WFP and the DPRK Government, annually 1.3 million 
children as well as pregnant and lactating mothers are guaranteed one balanced meal a day. 
• Italian Development Cooperation Office 
• French Cooperation Bureau 
Non-Resident International NGOs 
• American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 
• Agape International 
• Chosun Exchange 
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• Christian Friends of Korea (CFK) 
• Gesellschaft für Nachhaltige Entwicklung (Association for Sustainable Development) 
(GNE) 
• Global Resource Services (GRS) 
• Korea Maranatha Foundation (KMF) 
• Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) 
• Mercy Corps 
• Mission East 
• Samaritan’s Purse 
• World Vision 
Non-Resident Inter-governmental 
• Centre for Agricultural Bioscience International (CABI) 
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